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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A jury convicted Ronald Wisdom of three counts of !ewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen, allegedly committed against his step-daughter, M.L. Mr. Wisdom asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence that 
he made an ambiguous comment about having secrets prior to being accused of having 
committed any crime. Additionally, Mr. Wisdom asserts that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by effectively misstating the reasonable doubt standard and lowering the 
State's burden of proof, and by appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jurors 
when seeking a conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Ronald Wisdom on three counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen, with each count naming M.L. as the victim and identifying distinct 
time-periods in which the conduct allegedly occurred. 1 (R., pp.8-10.) The State later 
filed an Information Part II alleging that Mr. Wisdom was a persistent violator, having 
two prior felony convictions. (R., pp.58-59.) The case proceeded to trial. 
The prosecution's first witness was 20-year old Kayla Russell, Mr. Wisdom's 
brother-in-law's fiancee. (Tr. Trial, p.139, L.7 - p.140, L.4.)2 Between January and May 
of 2013, Ms. Russell spent a large amount of time at the Wisdom's house in Kuna 
visiting her fiance, Austin Moore. (Tr. Trial, p.140, L.7 - p.142, L.18.) There were as 
1 The time periods alleged in the Indictment corresponded with the time periods the 
Wisdom family, including M.L., lived in three different houses in Ada County. See 
~enerally Transcript of Grand Jury testimony. 
Multiple transcripts were created for this appeal. References to the 630-page 
transcript memorializing the bulk of the in-court proceedings will include the designation 
"Tr. Trial." 
1 
many as 7 adults and 5 children (including M.L.) living in the house during that time, and 
the atmosphere was "hectic." (Tr. Trial, p.142, L.19 - p.143, L.24; p.161, L:15 - p.164, 
L.16.) M.L., who was 14 at the time, would argue with her parents and her four younger 
siblings, and would frequently run off to the Zone, a place for minors associated with a 
local church, or M.L. would just sit under a table a cry. (Tr. Trial, p.142, L.19 - p.143, 
L.5; p.164, L.22 - p.172, L.16.) Ms. Russell testified that she had developed a bond 
with M.L., who would tell Ms. Russell about the things going on in her life. (Tr. Trial, 
p.144, L.5 - p.145, L.8.) 
Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor proffered testimony from 
Ms. Russell that, one day while a group of people were in the garage smoking 
cigarettes and "talking kind of about secrets and about things that we've done in the 
past," Mr. Wisdom stated, "'I have secrets that no one knows about, and I don't have to 
answer to anyone about them, not even God."' (Tr. Trial, p.150, L.3 - p.151, L.21.) The 
prosecutor asserted that the statement was relevant because "most of the people if not 
all the people in that garage were well aware of his prior conviction out of Twin Falls3 
and his drug history, et cetera" and, thus, the secret he referred to must be sexually 
abusing M.L.. (Tr. Trial, p.151, L.16 - p.152, L.13; p.154, Ls.8-21.) Defense counsel 
objected arguing that the comment was ambiguous and does not refer to the allegations 
in the present case, has minimal probative value, and is substantially prejudicial. 
(Tr. Trial, p.152, L.15 - p.154, L.1.) The district court found that Mr. Wisdom's comment 
3 In 2009, Mr. Wisdom pied guilty to one count of felony injury to a child, after originally 
being charged with 5 counts of lewd conduction with a minor, in Twin Falls County. 
(PSI, pp.9, 11.) Mr. Wisdom's plea was based upon his admission that he had abused 
drugs and exposed his prior step-children to that environment. (Tr. Trial, p.617, L.10 -
p.618, L.5.) 
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was admissible as a statement against interest pursuant to LR.E. 801 (d)(2), was 
relevant, and was not more prejudicial than probative. (Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.2-21.) 
When the jury returned, Ms. Russell testified about the conversation in the 
garage telling the jury that Mr. Wisdom said, '"I have secrets and things that I have done 
that I don't have to answer to nobody for, not even you, not even God."' (Tr. Trial, 
p.156, Ls.3-16.) When Mr. Wisdom's wife, Christina Wisdom, asked him what he was 
talking about, Mr. Wisdom "didn't really say anything." (Tr. Trial, p.156, Ls.17-22.) 
A couple of days later, while Ms. Russell and Mr. Moore were visiting with some 
of the residents of the Wisdom house, M.L. arrived home from school and told Ms. 
Russell that Mr. Wisdom had "touched" and "done things" to her. (Tr. Trial, p.156, L.23 
- p.157, L.25; p.159, Ls.22-24.) When Ms. Russell went to tell Mr. Moore what had 
occurred, M.L. ran off with her friends. (Tr. Trial, p.158, L.1 - p.159, L.10.) 
Mr. Wisdom's 26-year old son, Luccas McNeil!, was one of the people living at 
the Wisdom residence during 2013.4 (Tr. Trial, p.186, Ls.1-15; p.189, L.10- p.190, L.2; 
p.202, Ls.13-14.) He described the house as almost always unlocked, with a lot of 
people living there and a lot of others who would just walk in the front door without 
knocking when they would come for a visit, and he could not recall a time when he was 
alone in the house. (Tr. Trial, p.204, L.4- p.207, L.16; p.218, L.8- p.222, L.10; p.224, 
L.23 - p.224, L.10.) Mr. McNeil! observed that M.L. was becoming more and more 
unruly as she grew older, would get in more arguments with her parents and siblings, 
and would just run away in defiance when she did not like the responses she was 
getting from her parents. (Tr. Trial, p.210, L.21 - p.212, L.18.) Mr. McNeil! described 
4 Mr. McNeil! was placed up for adoption when he was 16 months old, and did not re-
connect with Mr. Wisdom until 2009. (Tr. Trial, p.186, L.16 - p.187, L.4; see also PSI, 
p.16.) 
3 
Mr. Wisdom as the main disciplinarian, and the children would take advantage of 
Ms. Wisdom when he was not there. (Tr. Trial, p.212, L.19 - p.214, L.5.) During the 
few weeks prior to making her allegations, M.L. had an on-going dispute with her 
parents over their refusal to get her a cell phone. (Tr. Trial, p.214, L.6 - p.215, L.4.) 
When Mr. McNeil! arrived home one day in early May of 2013,5 he heard a lot of 
screaming and things flying around the house and crashing; when he walked into the 
house, he saw Christina Wisdom "in an outrage" and throwing things around. (Tr. Trial, 
p.196, L.19 - p.198, L.10.) Ms. Wisdom calmed down, packed some things into her 
minivan, drove to the Zone to find M.L., and Mr. McNeil! followed her there. (Tr. Trial, 
p.198, L.24 - p.199, L.20.) Mr. McNeil! described M.L. as being "upset" when he saw 
her later in the day, and Ms. Wisdom asked him to call the police. (Tr. Trial, p.200, L.3 
- p.202, L.2.) During all of the time he lived in the house, Mr. McNeil! never saw or 
heard M.L. express any concern about being alone in the house with Mr. Wisdom.6 
(Tr. Trial, p.222, Ls.11-14.) 
Christina Wisdom testified that she and Ron had been married for 9 years. 
(Tr. Trial, p.238, Ls.1-16.) She had 4 children from a previous marriage to Wayne 
LeFler - 15 year-old M.L. and her brothers aged 14, 12, and 11 - and she and 
Mr. Wisdom have an 8 year-old daughter together. (Tr. Trial, p.238, L.19 - p.239, L.21.) 
She described Mr. Wisdom as treating all of her biological children as his own, and she 
5 Defense counsel referred to May 9, 2013, as the date M.L. made her allegations to 
Ms. Russell; however, it appears that the allegations were actually made the day before. 
iSee Tr. Trial, p.215, Ls.14-25; p.229, L.3- p.230, L.7.) 
Lucy McNeil!, who was adopted by the same family that adopted Luccas, testified that 
she also lived with the Wisdoms during this period of time growing very close to the 
family, and her description of the household, family dynamics, and the day M. L. made 
the allegations were substantially consistent with Mr. McNeill's description. (See 
Tr. Trial, p.512, L.1 - p.555, L.16.) 
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did not notice Mr. Wisdom being overly affectionate towards M.L. (Tr. Trial, p.382, L.13 
-- p.383, L.11.) Ms. Wisdom had a difficult pregnancy with M.L., who has learning and 
speech disabilities, and whose "comprehension is pretty low." (Tr. Trial, p.297, L.7 -
p.298, L.14.) Ms. Wisdom described living in three different houses from when M.L. 
was in kindergarten to the present time. (Tr. Trial, p.247, L.21 - p.255, L. 12; see also 
Ex.1.) Ms. Wisdom described the layout of the three houses and the large number of 
people, both adult and children, who lived in the houses at various times, including 
Mr. VVisdom's mother who suffered from multiple physical ailments and had limited 
mobility. (Tr. Trial, p.255, L.13 - p.278, L.8.) 
A year or two prior to making her allegations, M.L. stayed with her biological 
father in Arizona for about one month and, when she returned, she was angry and 
began acting out. (Tr. Trial, p.380, Ls.3-19.) Sometime between March and May of 
2013, M.L. started getting very angry and irritable towards her parents, and she started 
insisting that they get her a cell phone. (Tr. Trial, p.299, L.13 - p.300, L.7.) M.L. would 
frequently yell at her mother and would take off running to friends' houses, or 
occasionally just crawl under the table. (Tr. Trial, p.300, Ls.8-16; p.385, Ls.12-16.) 
On the morning of May 8, 2013, Ms. Wisdom told M.L. that she needed to clean 
her room but M.L. refused to do so. (Tr. Trial, p.303, Ls.5-23.) When Ms. Wisdom told 
M.L. that her room would be stripped bare if M.L. did not clean it, M.L. got very angry 
and told both Mr. and Ms. Wisdom that she hated them. (Tr. Trial, p.303, L.24 - p.304, 
L.6.) When Ms. Wisdom arrived home that day (about 10 minutes after M.L. arrived 
home from school), Kayla Russell relayed M.L.'s allegations and Ms. Wisdom started 
"freaking out." (Tr. Trial, p.304, L.7 - p.305, L.24.) After M.L. ran off to the Zone, 
Ms. Wisdom and her sister-in-law, Giselle, drove to the Zone, retrieved her, and 
5 
Ms. Wisdom and all of her children went to stay at her father's house, where she met 
with the police. (Tr. Trial, p.305, L.25 - p.310, L.5.) The next day, Ms. Wisdom took 
M.L. to CARES to be interviewed and to have a physical examination conducted; 
however, M.L. was resistant and did not want to get out of the car, and she refused a 
physical examination. (Tr. Trial, p.395, L.24 - p.396, L.16.) 
Over the next 5 months, Mr. Wisdom lived mostly with friends in the 
neighborhood, although he did move back into the house for about a week and a half 
when a detective told Ms. Wisdom that they could not build a case. (Tr. Trial, p.316, L.9 
- p.325, L.17.) Jennifer Ash testified that Mr. Wisdom stayed with her and her husband 
for a while, prior to charges being filed. (Tr. Trial, p.556, L.4 - p.565, L.14.) Ms. Ash 
testified that on one occasion, she saw M.L. come up to Mr. Wisdom and say, "'Hi, 
Daddy. I miss you."' (Tr. Trial, p.566, L.14 - p.567, L.8.) Another neighbor, Chuck Fox, 
testified that on one occasion all of the children in the neighborhood were playing in a 
bounce house, when M.L. and a friend came up to he and Mr. Wisdom, and M.L. and 
Mr. Wisdom had what Mr. Fox described as a "normal daughter/stepfather kind of 
encounter." (Tr. Trial, p.580, L.1 - p.589, L.5.) 
Not long after M.L. made her allegations, Ms. Wisdom placed M.L. in 
lntermountain Hospital,7 as her angry episodes became more frequent and more 
violent. (Tr. Trial, p.325, L.18 - p.327, L.9.) M.L. returned home after an 11-day stay at 
lntermountain and, although she was on medication, she began cutting herself. 
(Tr. Trial, p.327, L.10 - p.328, L.3.) Ms. Wisdom, who herself suffers from major 
depression, anxiety, and borderline personality disorder, attempted to help M.L. deal 
with her cutting problem, as she had "been a cutter" herself, but M.L.'s behavior 
6 
continued throughout the summer. (Tr. Trial, p.310, Ls.20-25; p.328, Ls.4-19.) At the 
beginning of June, 2013, M.L. went to speak with a detective and made a "confront call" 
to Mr. Wisdom using her mother's cell phone; Ms. Wisdom herself wore a wire on 
another occasion attempting to get Mr. Wisdom to make incriminating statements. 
(Tr. Trial, p.329, L.12 -p.332, L.2.) Mr. Wisdom made no incriminating statements. Id 
Prior to M.L. testifying, a comfort dog named "Sunday" was brought into the 
courtroom and sat near M.L.'s feet in the witness box, and the court read the jury an 
instruction telling the jurors that "somewhat different procedures" are followed when a 
"youthful witness" testifies so they won't be "intimidated by the courtroom atmosphere." 
(R., pp.73-80, 114; Tr. Trial, p.461, L.12 - p.463, L.16.) Although it appears she was 
initially hesitant to answer the prosecutor's question,8 M.L. testified that when she was 
in the third grade (the time period alleged in Court I), Mr. Wisdom touched her vagina 
with his mouth, penis, and finger. (Tr. Trial, p.469, L.7 - p.474, L.16.) When it 
appeared that M.L. was either unable or unwilling to answer the prosecutor's question 
about what M.L. meant when she said Mr. Wisdom "fingered" her, the court held a 
bench conference, and the prosecutor asked M.L. if it would be easier for her if the court 
ordered her family members to leave, but M.L. declined. (Tr. Trial, p.473, Ls.9-25.) 
M.L. testified that Mr. Wisdom asked her if she would ever tell, and she promised him 
that she would not. (Tr. Trial, p.472, Ls.21-24.) She testified that the same type of 
conduct occurred "randomly" during the time periods alleged in Counts II and Ill of the 
7 Ms. Wisdom described lntermountain as a "psychiatric mental hospital." {Tr. Trial, 
r.404, Ls.20-23.) 
After M.L. agreed that something happened between her and Mr. Wisdom that made 
her feel uncomfortable, the prosecutor asked "What was it that happened? Would it be 
easier to close your eyes, or are you thinking about what happened? [M.L.], are you 
going to be able to talk to us and tell us what happened?" (Tr. Trial, p.469, Ls.7-16.) 
7 
Indictment. (Tr. Trial, p.474, L.17 ·- p.481, L.18.) M.L. testified that she told her mother 
about the touching at some point prior to May of 2013, but the contact did not stop. 
(Tr. Trial, p.478, Ls.7-13.) 
M.L. testified that she decided to tell people what was happening after she heard 
a person on the radio encourage people who were aware of abuse to tell someone; she 
told her friends at school, and then told Kayla Russell when she got home from school. 
(Tr. Trial, p.481, L.22 - p.484, L.1.) When she spoke with her mother a few minutes 
later, Ms. Wisdom began "freaking out on everyone," and M.L. ran off to the Zone. 
(Tr. Trial, p.484, L.2 - p.485, L.5.) M.L. did not talk to the police that night, and did not 
participate in the physical examination the next day because she believed that it wou!d 
be performed by a male doctor. (Tr. Trial, p.485, L.6 - p.487, L.21.) Ultimately, she 
agreed to speak with the detective in charge of her case because her family members 
and neighbors all thought that she was lying. (Tr. Trial, p.488, L.1 p.490, L.1.) 
Mr. Wisdom was arrested on October 19, 2013; over 5 months after M.L. first 
accused him of sexually abusing her. (Tr. Trial, p.333, Ls.19-23.) 
During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: 
In order for you to acquit, to find him not guilty, you have to 
disbelieve the State's witnesses and think that [M.L.] completely made this 
up. You have to believe that she was so mad over not getting a cell 
phone or being able to hang out with her friends or have a messy room 
that this 14-year old made this all up. 
(Tr. Closing, p.66, Ls.11-17.)9 During the State's rebuttal argument, the prosecutor 
argued, 
9 Two separate transcripts were created for Day 3 of the jury trial occurring on 
February 28, 2014; one containing the remaining witness testimony, reading of the final 
jury instructions, and closing arguments, and the other containing the reading of the 
verdict and Mr. Wisdom's admission to being a persistent violator. For ease of 
reference, the transcript containing the closing arguments will be cited as "Tr. Closing," 
8 
The jury instruction says you cannot base your decision on 
sympathy or prejudice. But that doesn't mean that you totally put all of 
your emotions aside and have to stand back and assess the evidence as 
though you are an automaton. If you reacted to how [M.L.] was testifying 
because you felt bad for her and you felt like she was being pressed to 
talk about stuff that was very difficult to talk about, then you believe her. 
And believing her is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed 
these crimes. 
(Tr. Closing, p.99, Ls.3-13.) No objection was raised to either of these arguments. 
The jury found Mr. Wisdom guilty of all charges and Mr. Wisdom admitted to 
being a persistent violator. (R., pp.148-149; Tr. EOP.) The district court sentenced 
Mr. Wisdom on each count to concurrent unified terms of 40 years, with 20 years fixed. 
(R., pp.157-161.) Mr. Wisdom filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.164-166.) 
and the transcript containing Mr. Wisdom's admission to being a persistent violator will 
be cited as "Tr. EOP." 
9 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to present 
evidence that Mr. Wisdom made a comment about having secrets and having 
done things that no one can judge him for? 
2. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by misstating the State's burden of proof 
and by appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jurors? 
10 
ARGUMENT 
L 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Present Evidence 
That Mr. VVisdom Made A Comment About Having Secrets And Having Done Things 
That No One Can Judge Him For 
A Introduction 
Mr. Wisdom asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the 
State to present evidence that he said, '"I have secrets and things that I have done that I 
don't have to answer to nobody for, not even you, not even God."' (Tr. Trial, ,p.156, 
Ls.3-16.) Mr. Wisdom asserts that the State failed to demonstrate that his comment 
was related to the charged conduct and, therefore, the State failed to show the 
comment was relevant. Alternatively, even if there is some relevance to Mr. Wisdom's 
comment, the limited probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Mr. Wisdom further asserts that the State will be unable to prove the district court's 
erroneous admission of the evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Wisdom 
Made A Comment About Having Done Things That No One Can Judge Him For 
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 
584, 590 (2013) (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).) "'A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts 
within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and 
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Id. (quoting Fazzio v. Mason, 
150 Idaho 591, 594 (2011 ).) 
11 
1. Mr. Wisdom's Comment Was Not Relevant And, Therefore, Was Not 
Admissible 
Relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of 
Evidence, while evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. I.RE. 402. Evidence is 
relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. I.RE. 401. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that 
is freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008). When determining 
whether proffered evidence is relevant, an appellate Court looks to the legal theories 
presented by the parties. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 582, 592 (2010). 
The district court found the proffered evidence to be relevant without providing 
any insight into how the court reached its conclusion. (Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.6-12) The 
district court's conclusion was erroneous. The prosecutor asserted that Mr. Wisdom's 
comment was relevant because "most of the people if not all the people in that garage 
were well aware of his prior conviction out of Twin Falls and his drug history, et cetera" 
and, thus, he could only be referring "to this conduct here." (Tr. Trial, p.151, L.16 -
p.152, L.13; p.154, Ls.8-21.) This argument is without merit for multiple reasons. 
First, the prosecutor's argument is based upon the unsubstantiated premise that 
Mr. Wisdom has only done three things in his life that would meet the criteria, in his 
mind, of being "secrets and things that I have done that I don't have to answer to 
nobody for, not even you, not even God." The fact that the prosecutor may believe 
Mr. Wisdom could only have three possible "secrets" simply does not make it true. 
Neither the rules of evidence, nor basic logic, support the prosecutor's relevance 
argument. 
12 
Second, even if one accepts the basic premise that Mr. Wisdom's comment 
could not have referred to either his prior criminal history or his prior drug use because 
the others in the garage already knew about it, a premise that is not itself substantiated 
by the evidence,10 there is still nothing to support the conclusion that Mr. Wisdom was 
referring to sexually abusing M.L. Ms. Russell testified that the people in the garage 
"were all talking kind of about secrets and about things that we've done in the past and 
kind of things that we wish we could change and things that we wished we hadn't done." 
(Tr. Trial, p.150, Ls.15-18.) Mr. Wisdom had neither been informally accused nor 
formally charged with having sexually abused M.L. when he made the comment in the 
garage. Had Mr. Wisdom's comment been made in the context of someone confronting 
him with an allegation that he sexually abused M.L., his comment would likely be 
admissible. 
However, in the context of how it was actually made with no allegation or even a 
suggestion that Mr. Wisdom had sexually abused, M.L., Mr. Wisdom's comment can 
only be viewed as an admission to sexually abusing M.L., if one first assumes that 
Mr. Wisdom sexually abused M.L. By the prosecutor's "bootstrapping" logic, if one 
assumes that Mr. Wisdom robbed a bank, his comments would be admissible to prove 
he robbed a bank. Furthermore, the prosecutor's legal construct would work for any 
charge. If, for example, Mr. Wisdom had been charged with murder, Mr. Wisdom's 
comment would be relevant to show he committed murder because, after all, the other 
10 Ms. Russell testified that the people in the garage included her, Mr. Wisdom, 
Ms. Wisdom, Luccas McNeil!, Lucy McNeil!, and one or two of the kids, including 
possibly M.L. (Tr. Trial, p.150, Ls.3-12.) The State presented no evidence supporting 
their claim that "most of the people if not all the people in that garage were well aware of 
his prior conviction out of Twin Falls and his drug history, et cetera."(See generally 
Tr.Trial.) 
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people in the garage already knew about his prior criminal and drug history; thus, he 
could have only been talking about unlawfully killing another human being with malice 
aforethought. The State's argument, and the presumed reason the district court allowed 
Mr. Wisdom's comment into evidence, does not stand up to either logical or legal 
scrutiny. 
In sum, the fact that Mr. Wisdom said "I have secrets and things that I have done 
that I don't have to answer to nobody for, not even you, not even God," does not make it 
more or less likely that Mr. Wisdom committed lewd conduct against M.L. Therefore, 
the comment was not relevant and not admissible. 
2. Any Limited Relevance Of Mr. Wisdom's Comment Was Substantially 
Outwei hed B Its Pre·udicial Effect 
Even if there is some limited relevance to Mr. Wisdom's comment, the relevance 
was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. "Although relevant, evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. 
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not 
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The district court recognized the application of I.R.E. 403 and stated, without 
analysis, "I don't think it should be kept out on those bases." (Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.13-21.) 
The district court abused its discretion. As noted above, Mr. Wisdom never admitted to 
sexually abusing M.L. There is nothing in the context of making the comment that 
14 
suggests that Mr. Wisdom was even aware of allegations that he sexually abused M.L., 
let alone that this alleged abuse was the secret he was keeping. 
Even if there was some limited relevance, the fact that Mr. Wisdom's comment 
was non-specific, makes it substantially more likely that the jurors took the comment as 
an admission by Mr. Wisdom that he was a person of bad character. Evidence of a 
person's poor character is not admissible to prove the person acted in conformity 
therewith. I.RE. 404. "This exclusion is based upon the theory that such evidence 
induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the charged 
crime because he or she is a person of bad character." State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 
54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In the present case, there is a substantial danger that the jury hearing 
Mr. Wisdom admit that he has secrets and has done things that no one, not even God, 
could judge him for, would find him guilty of the charged offense based not upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes, but rather based upon a 
finding that he is a person who has done some things that are really bad and he needs 
to be punished for them. As such, even if there was some relevance, the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to exclude Mr. Wisdom's comments as their probative 
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt 
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
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(2010). 'To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence 
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). For the reasons more fully 
articulated in section 1(8)(2) of this brief above and section 11(8)(3) of this brief below, 
the State will be unable to prove the error in admitting Mr. Wisdom's comment harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
11. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct B if Misstating The State's Burden Of Proof And 
B A ealin To The Passions And Pre"udices Of The Jurors 
A Introduction 
The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments both by 
misstating the State's burden of proof and by appealing to the passions and prejudices 
of the jurors. Although Mr. Wisdom did not object to the prosecutor's arguments, he 
asserts that the misconduct violated his right to due process, was plain on the face of 
the record, and the misconduct was not harmless. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During The State's Closing Arguments 
Amounting To Fundamental Error, Requiring This Court To Vacate Mr. Wisdom's 
Conviction 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law 
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
"Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts 
may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in 
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question qualifies as fundamental error[.]" Id. "Such review includes a three-prong 
inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that 
the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 228. 
1. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Effectively Misstating The 
Reasonable Doubt Standard And Lowering The State's Burden Of Proof, 
And By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury, All Of 
Which Deprived Mr. Wisdom His Right To A Fair Trial 
During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: 
In order for you to acquit, to find him not guilty, you have to 
disbelieve the State's witnesses and think that [M.L.] completely 
made this up. You have to believe that she was so mad over not getting 
a cell phone or being able to hang out with her friends or have a messy 
room that this 14-year old made this all up. 
(Tr. Closing, p.66, Ls.11-17 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor's argument is a 
misstatement of the reasonable doubt standard and effectively lowers the State's 
burden of proof. A prosecutor commits misconduct during closing arguments by 
misstating the law and lowering the State's burden of proof. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 
82, 86-86 (Ct, App. 2007) (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1992); 
State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 168 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 
879, 882 (Ct. App. 1988).) 
The jurors did not need to disbelieve the State's witnesses or believe that M.L. 
made up the allegations in order to find Mr. Wisdom not guilty. 11 On the contrary, the 
jurors merely needed to have a reasonable doubt as to whether M.L.'s allegations were 
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true. If the jurors were unsure whether or not M.L. was telling the truth, the State would 
have failed to prove Mr. Wisdom was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
prosecutor, however, told the jurors that they could not acquit Mr. Wisdom unless they 
first concluded that M.L. "made this all up." A criminal defendant does not have the 
burden of proving the complaining witness made up the allegations; the State must 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crimes. 
The prosecutor committed misconduct by making this false argument. 
The prosecutor's misconduct continued during the State's rebuttal argument, 
The jury instruction says you cannot base your decision on 
sympathy or prejudice.12 But that doesn't mean that you totally put all of 
your emotions aside and have to stand back and assess the evidence as 
though you are an automaton. If you reacted to how [M.L.] was 
testifying because you felt bad for her and you felt like she was 
being pressed to talk about stuff that was very difficult to talk about, 
then you believe her. And believing her is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he committed these crimes. 
(Tr. Closing, p.99, Ls.3-13 (emphasis added).) After first telling the jury that they could 
not base their decision on sympathy or prejudice, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to 
base their decision on sympathy and prejudice. "[A]ppeals to emotion, passion or 
prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible." Phillips, 
144 Idaho at 87 (citing Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 
898 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844 (1982); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 
163, 168 (1980)). 
The prosecutor argued to the jury that, if they felt bad for M.L. and felt like she 
was being "pressed to talk about" the very allegations upon which Mr. Wisdom was 
standing trial, then they believed M.L. and must find Mr. Wisdom guilty beyond a 
11 The only witness the State called who testified that Mr. Wisdom committed lewd 
conduct was M .L. 
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reasonable doubt. Defendants have a due process right to impartial jurors who will 
determine whether the State proved the charged conduct beyond a reasonable doubt 
based upon the evidence presented, not based upon whether they felt bad for the 
complaining witness. The prosecutor committed misconduct in presenting this false 
argument. 
2. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no 
reason to believe that Mr. Wisdom's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by 
failing to object to the prosecutor lowering the State's burden of proof by falsely telling 
the jurors that unless they disbelieve M.L., they must find Mr. Wisdom guilty. There is 
also no reason to believe that Ms. Wisdom's counsel was "sandbagging" the district 
court by failing to object to the prosecutor's appeal to the passions and prejudices of the 
jury in arguing that any sympathy they felt for M.L. meant they believed her testimony, 
and was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There is simply no strategic advantage that 
can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to correct, the 
prosecutor's misstatement of the law and appeal to the passions and prejudices of the 
jurors. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face. 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless 
Because Mr. Wisdom did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, 
he bears "the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected 
the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Wisdom asserts that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of his trial. 
12 See Jury Instruction 1 (R., p.127). 
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The prosecutor's evidence was far from overwhelming. M.L.'s description of the 
alleged sexual abuse was light on details. ( See generally Tr. Trial, p.464, L.1 - p.506, 
L.20 (M.L.'s testimony).) Although M.L. claimed that the abuse only occurred in the 
various houses that she and her family lived in, various witnesses testified that many 
people lived in the houses at various times and many visitors entered the house without 
knocking, and none of the witnesses (other than M.L.) testified that they had ever seen 
any inappropriate interactions between Mr. Wisdom and M.L. (See generally, Tr. Trial.) 
There were plenty of reasons for the jury to have questioned M.L.'s believability. 
M.L. was apparently hesitant to testify. (Tr. Trial, p.469, L.7 - p.473, L.25.) The jury 
heard evidence that M.L. fought constantly with ~Ar. Wisdom and others and would 
throw what could rightfully be described as temper-tantrums when she did not get her 
way. (Tr. Trial, p.210, L.21 -p.212, L.18; p.300, Ls.8-16; p.385, Ls.12-16; p.523, L.11 -
p.524, L.6.) M.L. was initially uncooperative in the investigation, was hospitalized in a 
mental health facility, and began cutting herself after being released from the hospital. 
(Tr. Trial, p.395, L.24 - p.396, L.16; p.485, L.6 - p.490, L.1.) 
The prosecutor's misconduct was a targeted attempt at mitigating the 
shortcomings in the State's case. By telling the jurors that they had to completely 
disbelieve M.L.'s claims, rather than have a reasonable doubt as to their validity, in 
order to find Mr. Wisdom not guilty, the prosecutor gave the jurors permission to find 
Mr. Wisdom guilty even if they actually had a reasonable doubt about whether M.L.'s 
story was believable. By telling the jurors that their own emotional reaction to M.L.'s 
testimony is proof that she was telling the truth, the prosecutor gave the jurors 
permission to make their decision based upon their visceral reaction to watching M.L. 
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give her story, rather than the much more onerous task of determining whether or not 
M.L.'s story was true. 
Mr. Wisdom asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's 
misconduct affected the outcome of the trial, and the error is not harmless. See Perry, 
150 Idaho at 226. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wisdom respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand his case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 24 th day of March, 2015. 
qeputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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